MATCHING STRATEGIES TO SITUATIONS: PROGRAMMED AND ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES

**Francis George Umukoro[a], Owolabi Lateef Kuye[b]* and
Abdul-Hameed Adeola Sulaimon[b]**

[a]*Department of Business Administration, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria*
[b]*Department of Business Administration, University of Lagos, Nigeria*

Abstract

In the last few decades a greater number of literature of management have been inundated with a plethora of discussion on strategy in particular as its affect the conduct and performance of business in a much perceived dynamic environment. This, to all intents and purposes has contributed immensely to the success of businesses that have the opportunity to compete effectively in such dynamic and turbulent business environment. Two approaches to implementing strategy: programmed and adaptive were discussed in this paper. It was hypothesized that implementation of strategy can be made more acceptable using programmed approach, while adaptation holds that strategy implementation can be improved by processes that enable initial plans to be adapted to resulting events. The paper ended by proffering solutions to problems associated with environmental uncertainty and how strategy can effectively be matched to situations using either of the two approaches

Keywords: Strategies, Programmed implementation, Adaptive implementation, Implementers, Parameters, Environmental uncertainty

1. INTRODUCTION

Business performance is not only determined by how well strategies are formulated, it is also a function of how well implementation is carried out. Implementation task involves series of efforts targeted at transforming strategies intentions into action (Shah, 2005).

Following the perceived evidences of the disappointing results of social policies in education, health, welfare, housing, strategy makers and citizens alike have identified ineffective implementation as a central problem (Strickland & Thompson, 1987). Analysts have decided to go beyond

* *Corresponding author: labikuye@yahoo.com*

cataloging the seemingly unending ways for programs to fail and shift their attention to designing strategies to improve implementation.

Scholars and management practitioners have developed two identifiable approaches regarding the design of implementation of strategies. One of these approaches called programmed implementation assumes that implementation problems can be made tolerable, if not eliminated, by careful and explicit preprogramming of implementation procedures. The other view, which could be called adaptive implementation, holds that strategy execution can be improved by processes that enable initial plans to be adapted to unfolding events and decisions.

These approaches are by no means opposites rather they are strikingly different in point of view and practice. They tend to diagnose the source of implementation problems differently and offer apparently contrary prescriptions. Moreover, either of the proponents of these approaches seems to be arguing that their approach is superior or, more often, that the other approach cannot do the job.

Neither approach is new, nor are their supporting arguments unfamiliar. One can hear reverberations of old themes: rational analysis versus muddling through, scientific management versus organization development, top-down compliance versus grass-roots control.

This paper is developed to play out variations on these themes in the context of strategy implementation. It is my belief that there is no universally best way to implement strategy. Either programmed or adaptive implementation can be effective if applied to the appropriate strategy situation, but a mismatch between approach and situation aggravates the very implementation

problems these approaches seek to overcome.

2. PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH DESIGNING IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

Strategic implementation is concerned with how a firm executes its corporate strategy or its plans for the overarching identity and direction of the firm (Forman & Argenti, 2005). However, Strickland and Thompson (1987) were of the opinion that the problem of designing implementation of strategies consists of at least three components. First, strategy implementers need to develop more effective implementation techniques for both programmed and adaptive strategies. Second, they need to recognize different types of situations intrinsic to the context within which a strategy is to be implemented. Third, they need to learn to match strategies to the situation.

This paper treats the last two issues. After describing and comparing programmed and adaptive implementation strategies, broad features of strategy situation were characterized in ways that provide clues for implementers to choose between a programmed or an adaptive approach. Strategy situations are often so complex that a mix of programmed and adaptive strategies might be more effective than a simple choice between the two.

This study also offers a related message for researchers: A context-free theory of implementation is unlikely to produce powerful explanations or accurate predictions. The study has sought to identify variables that account for the past decade's rather dismal implementation experiences.

For example, the ambiguity and lack of clarity in strategy objectives, the participation of too many actors in decision-making during implementation, and the uncontrolled discretion of implementers have been cited as prominent reasons for implementation problems. Yet it can be argued that ambiguity, participation, and discretion do not hurt but rather contribute to effective implementation. Why these inconsistent findings? The effects of ambiguity, participation, and discretion as well as many other variables are contingent on their interaction with relatively fixed elements of the strategy situation or context. Until the contingent elements in strategy situations are identified, contradictory research findings can be expected. In short, researchers need a contingency analysis of implementation, elements of which are described here.

The research aim of developing a contingency analysis is the opposite side of the coin of the strategy problem of matching implementation to its strategic situation. Ambiguity, participation, and discretion represent design variables that strategy formulators often can control, at least to some extent, and programmed and adaptive implementation embody choices about these variables. In contrast, some characteristics of the situation are relatively fixed in the sense of being unchangeable by short-run strategy choices. Since a strategy's outcome depends on the interaction between strategies and constraints, strategy makers should choose implementation strategies according to the situation's constraints.

The actual design of workable implementation strategies must, however, be concrete, constructed from the bricks and mortar of particular strategies implemented in unique settings. The broad concepts presented here provide only a framework for thinking about how strategies could be matched to actual situations.

3.   PROGRAMMED   VERSUS ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

The programmed approach calls for clarity, precision, and comprehensive¬ness of the tentative strategy or design specification (Nelson, 1998). Such specificity is sought before the final decision on strategy alternatives. Once the decision is taken, preprogrammed implementation procedures are supposed to be followed by all levels of the organization or government involved.

The programmed approach diagnoses implementation problems as arising from at least three sources:

1. ambiguity in strategic goals resulting in or caused by misunderstanding, confusion, or value conflict;

2. participation of too many actors with overlapping authority; and

3. implementers' resistance, ineffectualness, or inefficiency.

The first difficulty, ambiguity in goals, is assumed to leave implementers without adequate guidance. The net result is uncoordinated efforts among diverse agencies so that different horses pull in different directions. For example, activities of the Nigeria Football Federation (NFF, formerly Nigeria Football Association (NFA) vividly shows how unclear goals at the top can lead to bureaucratic infighting. Legislation, rather than executive vagueness, is another source of goal ambiguity as can be observed in most of the agencies of Nigerian government. Thus, legislation often embodies multiple goals because of

compromises among competing interest groups, as in the classic case of the Nigerian Standard Organization and the Nigerian Food and Drug Administration Agency (NAFDAC). Consequently, agencies at the federal, state, or local levels can legitimately weight their priorities toward different, albeit conflicting, goals.

To ameliorate ambiguity, whatever its source, officials using a programmed approach would formulate specific, detailed, and presumably consistent objectives to be followed by lower-level personnel. The specification of objectives might be arranged in a nested hierarchy of ends-means, both within administrating agencies and from one level of government to another. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) represents one systematic way to formulate this goal hierarchy, and Management-by-Objectives (MBO) is perhaps its most complete and explicit statement. Different strategies can be pursued in developing these clear and detailed goals statements. For example, they can evolve from a long process of bargaining at each operational level, as the advocates of MBO suggest.

The proponents of programmed implementation cite a second problem related to ambiguous goals-namely, unclear lines of authority coupled with an excessive number of actors with decision-making power. Implementation difficulties caused by multiple actors also arise when competing governmental agencies have overlapping responsibilities, the apparent norm in most social service areas. In this case, no one may be willing or able to exercise final authority. Implementers at lower levels are consequently able to do what they wish; such uncontrolled discretion is seen to be at the heart of the "bureaucracy problem" (Hills &

Jones, 1995). The programmed prescription for anticipating and easing these authority problems takes two familiar and related forms. One is to specify clear lines of authority (with the usual slogan "authority should match responsibility") and the other is to minimize the number of participants in the strategy process.

Whatever problems may be created by unclear goals, cluttered lines of authority, and permissive participation, they exacerbate, in the programmed implementer's diagnosis, the fundamental problems of the resistance, ineffectualness, or inefficiency of low-level implementers. Low-level implementers, called hereafter deliverers, are perceived as operating in routinized ways that should be prescribed and circumscribed by standard operating procedures. Deliverers may not comply with or may resist strategy that implies alterations in routines. For example, Weatherley and Lipsky (1977) provide illustrations of how deliverers, who they call "street-level bureaucrats," can distort programmatic goals by developing routine coping mechanisms that handle their jobs, but are contrary to the strategy's intent.

Programmed implementation would deal with deliverer resistance by several means:

1. Limiting the discretion that deliverers have in implementation by formulating new and explicit standard operating procedures;

2. Monitoring deliverer behavior to ensure that they can be held accountable for the new procedures- it is assumed that sanctions will be applied if they are not;

3. Changing the allocation of incentives to deliverers, particularly extrinsic incentives (e.g., salary, bonuses, and status rewards).

In addition to questions of forestalling resistance, programmed implementers would

attempt to anticipate, and thus prevent, unwanted actions on the part of deliverers. Whether the strategy is President Yaradua's determination to control the details of the militants in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria or an innovative approach to reading in a school, the fear is that deliverers may encounter new situations during implementation; if left to their own devices, they may respond in ways that are ineffective and perhaps counter to the strategy. This may occur, aside from resistance, because deliverers are unaware of relevant knowledge or because they lack the ability to follow a preferred course. These problems give rise to the formulation of extended contingency plans that become incorporated into standard operating procedures.

Finally, programmed implementers suspect that deliverers tend to implement new strategy inefficiently. To compensate for such inefficiency, officials would develop uniform practices that incorporate high-quality technical specifications and guidelines that can be followed by deliverers. The National University Commission in Nigeria (NUC), for example, has been disseminating to universities packages that lay out the procedures for implementing innovations successfully demonstrated in other developed countries. Proponents of packages argue that a university adopting a packaged innovation can avoid "reinventing the wheel" and skip many of the errors in the usual trial-and-error procedure of implementing a new educational practice. Efficiency would be gained by prescribing the steps in implementation and thus limiting the deliverers' discretion.

To summarize, programmed implementers would produce a well-specified, perhaps completely specified plan that has clear and detailed objec¬tives, clean lines of responsibility and limited participation in strategy-making, anticipates various contingencies, and requires minimum discretion for all levels of implementers, particularly the deliverers' Put in its most extreme terms, the ideal is to make an initial decision on strategy that includes an automatically executed implementation program. Aside from minor adjustments to keep the program on track, strategy makers would have no need to deal with implementation once they had chosen. The aim is, in short, is to make the relationship between strategy decision and output "implementation proof."

4. ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

Adaptive implementers offer a different diagnosis and prescription. Implementation problems arise because of the over-specification and rigid¬ity of goals, the failure to engage relevant actors in decision-making, and the excessive control of deliverers. Although, adaptivity refers to the ability of a firm to respond to signals or stimuli of relevance appropriately (Jacobs & Statler, 2003), the ideal of adaptive implementation is the establishment of a process that allows strategy to be modified, specified, and revised—in a word, adapted according to the unfolding interaction of the strategy with its institutional setting. Its outcomes would be neither automatic nor assured, and it would look more like a disorderly learning process than a predictable procedure.

In contrast to the highly specified plans of programmed implementation, adaptive implementation approach seeks only general,

perhaps vague, or even tacit agreement on goals. If not goals, then agreement on means would suffice. As Lindblom (1959) has persuasively argued, people having different values may be able to agree on means or loose objectives, but not detailed goals. Moreover, ambiguity in goals can allow partisans to agree on adjustments in strategy, which adaptive implementers conceive of as a stream of ends-means decisions (Richards, 1996). Thus adaptive implementation is concerned with establishing acceptable rules of the game that would allow multiple participants to bargain and compromise during the course of implementation.

Adaptive implementation also calls for the active participation of relevant actors, which is seen to afford two benefits. First, it would enhance problem-solving during implementation, because diverse participants are assumed to bring more information and more points of view to bear; such diversity could ameliorate serious problems of "group think," high-level management bias, or lack of communication. Indeed, Pearce and Robinson (2000) detect an invisible intelligence of participative processes that produces better outcomes in the long run. Second, it is maintained, on the basis of organizational and management literature, that when people participate they are motivated to do a good job. A study of the Nigeria Civil service organizations revealed that innovations found that successfully implemented projects used adaptive strategies, including the participation of staff at all levels of the service. The study hypothesized that participation, particularly among civil servants, helped develop a sense of ownership among the staff that eroded initial resistance to change and kept the staff going through the often traumatic experience of implementing innovations (Berman &

McLaughlin, 1978).

Adaptive implementation proponents believe in considerable discretion for deliverers. Part of this belief stems from a reaction to the programmed approach. For example, Hammer and Champy (1993) argues that excessive control by way of programmed guidelines, standard operating procedures, and so on can have counterproductive effects on implementation. Deliverers formulate coping strategies that subvert strategic goals. Or, as the civil service study discovered, excessive control can lead deliverers to follow guidelines only symbolically. In either event, adaptive implementation assumes that strategy can be implemented more effectively if deliverers have the freedom (in terms of resources, legitimacy, and support from higher levels) to adjust strategy to the exigencies of local conditions. Moreover, it is believed that deliverers may need to "learn by doing," rather than mechanically follow a "how-to-do-it" procedure, in order to implement strategy more effectively. By designing implementation strategies that provide and support discretion for deliverers to learn as they implement, the prospects for a successful strategy outcome would be enhanced.

Evaluation plays a different role in adaptive implementation than it does in programmed implementation. In the latter, evaluators would monitor deliverers to check on the fidelity of implementation: Are prescribed standard operating procedures being followed? Quantifiable out-comes would be compared to expected, explicitly laid-out objectives. Two actions could be taken in the case that outcomes were below expectations. One, if deliverers were found to have deviated from the prescribed program, they could be held accountable and

sanctioned or perhaps a change in resource allocation or incentives could be employed. Ideally, program designers would have decided on these compliance procedures before implementation. Two, if deliverers had adhered to the guidelines, and objectives were nonetheless unmet, then the prescribed guidelines could be modified incrementally.

Adjustments made in the program would be incremental, not major. Programmed implementation assumes that the basic strategy decision is essentially correct. If considerable evaluation evidence accumulates to the contrary, then the strategy might be dropped instead of adapted. The strategy would be judged, in short, to have failed.

In contrast, adaptive implementers would ideally use evaluation to further adaptation, not fidelity to an initial decision and plan of operations. The initial plan would be expected to mutate at the level of a local implementing unit, because each implementing unit must adjust to its idiosyncratic conditions as it learns by doing. Consequently, evaluation would be asked to provide information so that local adjustment and learning could take place. The feedback data for higher-level decision makers would be primarily about the adaptive process and secondarily about outcomes. Insofar as adaptation was not proving workable, it would be adjusted so that the process itself could evolve (Majone & Wildavsky, 1978). Moreover, strategy would not be seen as set in concrete. Indeed, adaptive implementation is viewed as a means for attaining clarity about strategy, and evaluation evidence would be used to help decide on the specifics of strategy itself. Strategy decision-making and implementation thus form a seamless web with evaluation providing interior glue.

5. ACCESSING SITUATIONAL PARAMETERS

From the preceding discussions, programmed and adaptive implementations have now been sketched in general terms. Though their specific features and techniques remain to be fleshed out, this study has more pressing business. Designers of implementation strategies need to be concerned with those elements of the policy situation that they cannot affect, as well as strategic elements that they can. The reason why may not be unconnected with clear intuition. The effectiveness of implementation strategies depends on how they interact with constraints inherent in the strategy situation.

In particular, research strongly suggests that the organizational, political, social, and legal context within which a policy is implemented profoundly affects its chances for success. Since the context varies at the micro level from one school environment to another, from hospital to hospital, from police department to police department, and so on, a strategy's overall implementation reflects local differences.

In short, the context or strategy situation matters, it varies from delivery system to delivery system, and strategy formulators ought to choose implementation strategies to match the different situations.

So far so good, But to what dimensions of the situation should designers pay attention? Are there generalizable dimensions that provide heuristics for diagnosing the situation? Or is the world of local delivery systems so particularistic that no general guides are helpful?

The implementation literature does not definitively answer these questions, nor does it offer a conceptual framework for exploring

possible answers. The following is consequently a speculative discussion of general dimensions that might help designers to diagnose situations and thereby aid them to choose between programmed and adaptive strategies, or more realistically, to mix elements of each strategy.

Five broad parameters (scope of change, uncertainty of technology or theory, conflict over strategy goals, institutional setting) of different types of strategy situations are discussed. To pick an implementation approach, all five parameters need to be considered simultaneously. If all the following conditions in the strategy situation hold, a programmed approach would be appropriate:

1. The scope of change, implied by the policy, in the behavior of members of the implementing system is incremental;

2. The validity of the strategy's technology (or theory) is relatively certain;

3. Members of the implementing system generally agree on the strategic goals and means;

4. The coordination structure of the implementing system is tightly coupled;

5. The environment of the implementing system is relatively stable.

However, if any of these conditions do not hold, elements of adaptive implementation strategies would be needed to cope with anticipated implementation problems. The remainder of this section briefly discusses each condition.

6. SCOPE OF CHANGE

A strategy's scope of change is the kind and amount of change in the standard behavior of members of the implementing system implied by that strategy. Small changes in organizational behaviour might involve many actors, as in the change introduced in taxation guidelines. Conversely, major change in behavior might be required of few people, as in free education in a school or bail reform in a court system (Friedman, 1996).

Small changes in organizational behaviour might involve many actors, as in the change introduced in taxation guidelines. Conversely, major change in behavior might be required of few people, as in free education in a school or bail reform in a court system (Friedman, 1996).

Some writers on strategy implementation have discussed the importance of the scope of change (Pearce & Robinson, 2000), but often in very different ways than used here. For example, a usual hypothesis, derived presumably from common sense, holds that the smaller the scope of change, the more likely or effective is implementation. Two problems unfortunately challenge the usefulness of this hypothesis. First, it is often false! For example some studies found an almost opposite result for educational innovations. Projects demanding little change in teacher behaviour were likely to be implemented in a pro forma fashion, whereas ambitious change efforts that engaged the sense of professionalism among teachers could be made to work with appropriate implementation strategies. In short, little ventured, nothing gained.

Second, the form of the hypothesis itself is the product of a flawed conceptual paradigm. In the usual scientific paradigm, scope of change is an independent variable with a hypothesized effect on a dependent variable (e.g., implementation effectiveness or change in outputs). But this simple relationship may not be a fruitful way to cast implementation issues because a strategy's

scope of change may be a given condition (or parameter) of the situation for the designer of an implementation strategy, not an independent variable in the classic sense. Thus a conditional (or contingent) statement is relevant to the design issue: Given a strategy's implied scope of change, design choice strategy X is more likely to lead to effective implementation than design choice strategy Y.

In particular, all other things being equal, strategy involving minor change in the behaviour of existing staff (e.g., modifications in tax guidelines or computer-assisted instruction techniques) would appear to be more effectively or more efficiently implemented using a programmed approach. The reasons seem clear enough. Implementation can be programmed along existing lines of authority and can consist of modification to established standard operating procedures.

Where strategy involves major behavioural change (e.g., the Aid to All Handicapped Children or community-based action programs), existing routines have to be redesigned, replaced, or sidestepped, and new routines must be invented (as strategy is implemented, not before). In this situation, programmed procedures could generate resistance to change and a lack of learning by doing among deliverers. Adaptive implementation, in contrast, would try to ameliorate resistance by encouraging extensive participation in the decision process so that implementers would help develop new standard operating procedures. It would deal with the need for learning by doing by giving deliverers discretion, as well as by holding them accountable for strict adherence to an initial plan.

7. UNCERTAINTY OF TECHNOLOGY OR THEORY

A second design parameter for implementation strategies is the degree of uncertainty about the validity of the technology or theory underlying a strategy. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1993) suggest, strategy assumes a theory relating strategy choice to outcomes. The theory may consist of or be based on a specific technology; or it might be an organizational procedure or technique. The outcome of a strategy thus depends both on its technological (or theoretical) validity and its implementation. Poor outcomes can result from either valid technology poorly implemented, or a well-executed strategy based on invalid theory. Furthermore, strategy can be based on technology (or theory) about which considerable uncertainty exists or on technology that is well in hand, as in the case of new agricultural practices (Glennan et al., 1998). The latter case of relatively certain technologies seems appropriate for a programmed implementation strategy. Designers can assume that all they need do is obtain high fidelity in implementation to produce effective outcomes. The validity of a strategy's technology can, on the other hand, be profoundly uncertain. This type of uncertainty is typical of new federal services, such as the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) , Industrial Training Fund Act (ITF), and National Education Policy.

When the validity of a strategy's theory is uncertain, the application of a programmed strategy can lead to severe implementation problems created, ironically, by the strategy itself. Besides causing problems, programmed implementation fails to assist deliverers in reducing technological

uncertainty. A major element of technological uncertainty can arise from the interaction of the strategy with peculiarities of the implementing system and its context. By constraining deliverer's abilities to adjust to these unique and unpredictable elements, programmed implementation restricts opportunities to find unique solutions to technical problems. In contrast, adaptive implementation seeks to provide deliverers the discretion, and hopefully the necessary bureaucratic support, to allow the technology to evolve in accordance with the peculiarities of the implementing system and its context.

8. CONFLICT OVER STRATEGY GOALS

The third situational parameter, the degree of conflict about strategy goals and means, reflects both the strategy's substance and its setting. Some strategies are launched in a context of relative consensus or only a low level of conflict. The mobilization programmes during wartime or crisis situations, merging and acquisition of banks during the recapitalization era provide examples in which the main actors in the implementing system basically agreed with the strategy's aims and means. At a more micro level, educational innovations at times begin with support of teachers or at least develop this support before implementation. And the usually neglected area of changes in regulations regarding tax laws, for example, can involve general cooperation among relevant actors, including legislators, interest groups, and guideline writers (Surrey, 1996). In these situations, programmed implementation seems feasible and may be desirable.

But a programmed approach used in conflict situations can backfire. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1957 in the old western region of Nigeria is a prime example from an exceedingly long list of social programmes born as much from conflict as consensus. The Office of Education attempts to implement Title I of the act by a programmed approach, particularly in the early years. These were met by resistance, disregard, and finally by a pro forma compliance that fell far short of reformers' goals. An adaptive approach, in contrast, would deal with conflict situations by assuming that implementation requires bargaining among the interested parties. Rather than using program implementation's carrot and stick tactics to override disagreements, means for negotiating an acceptable compromise would be sought. Because negotiation would occur during implementation, the strategy's outcome could be far different from its original intent.

9. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

The fourth parameter concerns the structure of a strategy's institutional setting, or what Rabinowitz et al. (1996) call a strategy's arena. One type of setting is the formal organization (schools, health care centers, governmental agencies, legislative bodies, and the like). The term micro-implementation will be used to refer to implementation within such organizations. The setting for national policy encompasses such organizations and much more. It usually consists of a collection of many diverse governments, bureaucracies, courts, public and private interest groups, local delivery systems, clients, and individual actors whose complex interactions are extraordinarily

difficult to document in any but anecdotal ways. The interactions in arenas such as criminal justice, health care, urban development, and education may be fluid, chaotic, and conflict prone, but they nonetheless follow tacit operating rules of the game, established roles, and routinized procedures. There often are, in short, enduring patterns of behaviour in national policy setting, which can be called the setting's micro-structure (Berman, 1998).

Although it is desirable to design implementation strategies that reflect the policy setting's macro- and micro-structures, the dimensions that should be tapped are difficult to identify in generalized terms. One broad concept that may be fruitful for heuristic purposes is loose coupling, a composite term connoting how a system is differentiated into operating units (i.e., its "division of labor") and how the units are coordinated (Weick, 1986). In a tightly coupled setting, the established pattern is high coordination among the various units, as in the case of military organizations, many effective production firms in relatively stable environments, and many public bureaucracies. Programmed implementation strategies seem suited to a tightly coupled system because an established pattern of compliance exists.

But a programmed approach applied to a loosely coupled setting can lead to the all too familiar problems of symbolic compliance and cooptation. The adaptive approach offers several advantages in these loosely situations. Aside from its tolerance of bargaining and adjustments the, adaptive implementation ideally would avoid insistence on strict adherence to uniform regulations. It would expect and encourage each local delivery unit (school district, local government, court, and the like) to adapt to central policy in ways suitable to local conditions. Moreover, it would seek local participation in policy and strategy development, which despite the risk of extra time, additional costs, and rising tempers, might help coordinate implementation through the mutual adjustment of otherwise partisan and uncoordinated actors (Elmore 1998). The adaptive approach, in short, acknowledges and would seek to work within the constraints of loose coupling.

10. STABILITY OF ENVIRONMENT

The final parameter is the stability of the environment. The term environment here refers to forces or conditions outside the implementing system that affect the system but are not affected, in major ways, by it. At the micro level, many social service organizations must respond to exogenous events, e.g., court orders, changes in governmental regulations, new state laws, the firing of a programmed advocate or opponent, or schoolteachers' strike. Such unforeseen events may merely cause a temporary disturbance for the overall operations of a local organization, but may profoundly affect the implementation of particular strategies.

11. MATCHING THE STRATEGIES TO SITUATIONS

It is obvious from the preceding analysis that programmed and adaptive implementation reflect different images of how strategy should be executed and how design choices (e.g., specificity of goals, management responsibilities, extent of staff participation, amount of discretion allowed

to deliverers, and type of evaluation) should be treated. Strategy could be more effectively carried out if these implementation strategies were chosen to match the strategy situation, especially the strategy's scope of change, its degree of technical certainty, the extent of agreement about the strategy, the degree of coordination characteristic of the implementing system, and the stability of the strategy's environment.

Further work needs to be done, of course, before the broad framework presented here could be applied to concrete situations. For example, this paper has considered only a choice between a programmed and an adaptive approach, but many strategy situations call for a combination of pro¬grammed and adaptive components. As an illustration, consider a strategy concerned with regulating a reasonably well-developed technology such as solar energy devices. Most elements in the situation might allow for a programmed approach, i.e., the technology might be judged to be relatively certain, a reasonable consensus might exist on the strategy's purposes, implementation might take place in a stable environment, and only minor behavioural or organizational change might be required for implementation. The implementation designer, therefore, might focus on developing adaptive coordination strategies and allow other aspects of implementation to be programmed (e.g., technical manuals for the use of the solar energy devices or a schedule of tax incentives).

Implementation strategies could also be mixed and switched across levels of a strategy system. Some federal policies, for example, might choose a division of implementation in which administration within the federal bureaucracy might be programmed and local delivery systems might be encouraged to follow adaptive strategies. Similarly, depending on the strategy situation, middle management in schools, criminal justice systems, social welfare agencies, and the like might follow programmed procedures, whereas deliverers might employ adaptive techniques.

In short, once strategy makers dispense with the image that implementation must be uniform for all strategy situations, invariable over time, and homogeneous across organizational levels, they can search for matching, mixing, and switching strategies to improve strategy performance.

ПОКЛАПАЊЕ СТРАТЕГИЈА СА СИТУАЦИЈОМ: ПРОГРАМСКИ И АДАПТИВНИ ПРИСТУПИ ИМПЛЕМЕНТАЦИЈИ

Francis George Umukoro[a], Owolabi Lateef Kuye[b]* and Abdul-Hameed Adeola Sulaimon[b]

[a]*Department of Business Administration, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria*
[b]*Department of Business Administration, University of Lagos, Nigeria*

Извод

У последњих неколико декада у великом броју литературних извора из области менаџмента јављају се дискусије о стратегији уопште и њеном утицају на показатење пословања, посебно у много динамичнијим окружењима. Ово је значајно допринело повећаном успеху пословања компанија које се могу ефективно такмичити у динамичком пословном окружењу. Постоје два приступа примени стратегија: програмски и адаптивни. Оба су приступа дискутована у овом раду. Постављена је хипотеза да се примена стратегије може учинити ефикаснијом применом програмског приступа, док адаптивни приступ може показати успех код процеса који омогућују да се полазни планови прилагоде резултујућим догажајима. рад се завршава доказивањем могућности решавања проблема који су повезани са несигурношћу у окружењу и како се стратегије могу ефикасно уклопити са актуелним ситуацијама применом једног од наведена два приступа.

Кључне речи: Стратегија, Планирана примена, Адаптивна примена, Примењивачи, Параметри, Несигурност окружења

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